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Studies investigating the neurophysiological basis of intrapersonal emotion regulation
(control of one’s own emotional experience) report that the frontal cortex exerts a
modulatory effect on limbic structures such as the amygdala and insula. However,
no imaging study to date has examined the neurophysiological processes involved in
interpersonal emotion regulation, where the goal is explicitly to regulate another person’s
emotion. Twenty healthy participants (10 males) underwent fMRI while regulating their
own or another person’s emotions. Intrapersonal and interpersonal emotion regulation
tasks recruited an overlapping network of brain regions including bilateral lateral frontal
cortex, pre-supplementary motor area, and left temporo-parietal junction. Activations
unique to the interpersonal condition suggest that both affective (emotional simulation)
and cognitive (mentalizing) aspects of empathy may be involved in the process of
interpersonal emotion regulation. These findings provide an initial insight into the neural
correlates of regulating another person’s emotions and may be relevant to understanding
mental health issues that involve problems with social interaction.
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INTRODUCTION
The adaptive control of emotional experience plays a critical role
in daily functioning and mental health (Gross and John, 2003).
The regulation of one’s own emotions is termed “intrapersonal
emotion regulation” (sometimes referred to as “intrinsic” reg-
ulation; Zaki and Williams, 2013), whereas regulation directed
toward another person’s emotions is termed “interpersonal emo-
tion regulation” (Niven et al., 2009, also known as extrinsic
emotion regulation; Zaki and Williams, 2013). A number of dif-
ferent strategies for interpersonal emotion regulation have been
identified. For example, if a friend is sad then one might try
to help them think about the situation differently in an effort
to alleviate the sadness. Such a strategy would be akin to the
intrapersonal emotion regulation strategy of cognitive reappraisal
(Gross, 1998).
The neural basis of intrapersonal emotion regulation is now
relatively well-established (see, e.g., Ochsner and Gross, 2005;
Wager et al., 2008; Kalisch, 2009; Buhle et al., 2013; Kohn et al.,
2014). Such studies have reported a network of brain areas
involved in the down-regulation of negative emotion, typically
elicited by affective images or videos, including the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), and anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) (Beauregard et al., 2001; Ochsner et al.,
2002; Phan et al., 2005; Goldin et al., 2008; Kalisch, 2009). Activity
within these frontal regions has been shown to modulate limbic
regions such as the amygdala and insula, both of which have been
associated with the perception and experience of emotions (Banks
et al., 2007; Wager et al., 2008). Supporting evidence is also pro-
vided by studies of individuals with serious emotion regulation
disturbance, such as major depression and borderline personality
disorder, where activation in the frontal cortex and subsequent
functional connectivity with limbic regions has been shown to
be disrupted during intrapersonal emotion regulation (Johnstone
et al., 2007; Koenigsberg et al., 2009).
It has been suggested that people use similar strategies to reg-
ulate others’ emotions as they use to regulate their own (Niven
et al., 2009). However despite the prevalence of interpersonal
emotion regulation processes in everyday life (Niven et al., 2009)
the neural underpinnings of interpersonal emotion regulation
have yet to be directly investigated. A recent study investigated
the neural basis of regulating one’s own emotion in response
to an interpersonal stimulus (namely, a confederate’s offer in a
bargaining game, Grecucci et al., 2013), finding that reappraisal
of another person’s intentions recruited areas of frontal cortex,
temporo-parietal function and the insula. However, participants
were not required to try to regulate the emotional responses of
the other person, which is the more typical use of the term inter-
personal emotion regulation. The current study builds on this
interest in studying the neural basis of interactive elements of
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emotion regulation, by identifying the neural regions involved in
the process of actively regulating another person’s emotions, and
investigating to what extent this differs or shares similarities with
intrapersonal emotion regulation.
Despite overlap in the types of strategy used for intra- and
interpersonal emotion regulation (e.g., a person can reappraise
their own emotional experience, or help someone else to do the
same), the process of interpersonal emotion regulation is likely
to differ from intrapersonal emotion regulation in a number of
ways. In particular, because interpersonal emotion regulation,
by definition, involves an aspect of interpersonal exchange (Zaki
and Williams, 2013) it seems likely that elements of social cog-
nition (the processes underlying social perception, engagement
and interaction) would be invoked that intrapersonal emotion
regulation does not necessarily require. Interpersonal emotion
regulation involves the identification of another person’s current
emotional state, based on contextual cues such as the presence
of an emotion eliciting stimulus, as well as bodily information
such as facial expression (Zaki and Williams, 2013). Following
identification of the other person’s emotional state, the affective
component of empathy may be needed to mirror an equivalent
affective state in the “self” (Preston and De Waal, 2002; Hooker
et al., 2010). Once this shared affective state is simulated, the
cognitive component of empathy may then be required to take
the perspective of the other person. Empathy has been proposed
(Preston et al., 2007) to be akin to “theory of mind” or “men-
talizing” (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Gallagher et al., 2000;
Frith and Frith, 2003). Finally, monitoring may also be required
in order to assess whether the regulation attempt has had the
desired effect on the target’s emotional state (e.g., does the per-
son look any less emotional?; Zaki and Williams, 2013). Despite
these clear conceptual differences between the processes of intra-
and interpersonal emotion regulation it is not currently known to
what extent the neurophysiological processes supporting the two
processes differ.
The present research therefore examined the neural areas acti-
vated during interpersonal emotion regulation and intrapersonal
emotion regulation. Both forms of emotion regulation were con-
trasted with a control task where participants were presented with
an emotional stimulus but not asked to engage in any form of
regulation. We were also interested in whether there would be
discernible differences in the neural correlates of interpersonal
emotion regulation as a result of the specific strategy used. This
follows on from investigations of intrapersonal emotion regula-
tion that have revealed differences in the neural underpinnings of
reappraisal and suppression (e.g., Goldin et al., 2008).
We hypothesized that interpersonal emotion regulation would
result in overlapping activations with intrapersonal emotion reg-
ulation, due to the need to simulate the other person’s emotional
state and associated regulatory processes. This might involve areas
such as the inferior frontal gyrus (BA44; Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2009). Furthermore, we hypothesized that interpersonal emotion
regulation would also activate brain areas previously implicated in
relevant aspects of social cognition. These include areas involved
in perspective taking and “mentalizing,” such as temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ), anterior regions of mPFC, superior temporal sul-
cus (STS) (Gallagher et al., 2000; Vogeley et al., 2001), areas
involved in the more cognitive component of empathy (e.g.
anterior temporal pole, vmPFC; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009), and
areas involved in making distinctions between “self” and “other”
(rostral frontal cortex; Burgess et al., 2007). Finally, we hypoth-
esized that, in line with previous research (e.g., Goldin et al.,
2008; Wager et al., 2008), engaging in intrapersonal emotion
regulation would involve a network of frontal regions including
DLPFC, VMPFC, and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC),
and ACC.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty right-handed healthy participants (10 males; mean
age= 23 years; range 18–30) were recruited from students and
staff at a UK University. Exclusion criteria included any psychi-
atric or neurological disorder or contraindication toMR imaging.
All participants spoke English as a first language and had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision.Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants and the study was approved by the
local Research Ethics Committee. Participants were reimbursed
for their time.
PROCEDURE AND STIMULI
Participants underwent two scans (one intrapersonal and one
interpersonal). During each scan, participants viewed a series of
short sad or disgusting videos. During each video, participants
were instructed to regulate either their own (intrapersonal con-
dition) or another person’s (interpersonal condition) emotional
state, or simply to watch the video (control “watch” condition).
Sadness and disgust were selected as target emotions due to the
relative ease of elicitation (Gross and Levenson, 1995). Videos
were selected from those used in previous research (e.g., Gross,
1998) and from public access online resources such as YouTube.
A pilot study had undergraduate students rate the emotional
impact of each video on arousal and the target emotion (disgust
or sadness). The final set of videos was matched for arousal rating
(mean arousal= 5.47 measured on a 7-point Likert scale).
Each trial commenced with a 5-s introductory screen dis-
playing the title of the video clip (e.g., “child war victims”), the
required regulation strategy for that trial (suppress, reappraise, or
watch) and three suggested strategy-relevant phrases. Suggested
phrases were, for reappraisal; “It’s just a film,” “It’s not happening
to me/you,” or “It’s not as bad as it looks,” and for suppression;
“Keep a straight face,” “I won’t show how I feel”/“Don’t show how
you feel” or “Grin and bear it.” During the “watch” control condi-
tion suggested phrases were “I’ll just keep watching”/“You should
just keep watching,” “See how this makes me/you feel” or “Watch
this carefully.” Participants were asked to select one specific strat-
egy from the list of phrases and to vocalize which strategy they
were using during the presentation of the video. This intro-
ductory screen was then followed by the 10-s emotion-eliciting
video.
During each video, in addition to the emotion-eliciting stimu-
lus, participants also saw another person simultaneously watching
and responding to the videos (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
This depiction took the form of an embedded video of another
person who was visible in the bottom right-hand corner of the
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FIGURE 1 | Description of paradigm. In both scans, each trial began with
the name of the clip and the instruction type (reappraise, suppress, or watch).
Three example phrases for emotion regulation were also provided. Following
the onset of the video, participants vocalized their choice of regulatory
strategy within the first 5 s. At the end of the video, the face of the person
watching the videos with them (bottom right-hand corner) remained visible
for 5 s. Participants then reported their or the other person’s affect and how
difficult they found the regulatory process.
screen1. For both intra- and interpersonal scans the other person’s
initial facial expression at the onset of each video was neutral.
Following onset of the video, the facial expression changed to one
congruent with the content of the video for five seconds (e.g., a
disgusted facial expression when the content of the video was dis-
gusting), during which time participants were required to vocalize
their emotion regulation strategy2. Participants were told that the
other person watching the videos would be able to hear them only
during the interpersonal run and that they had been instructed
to use the advice given by the participant to regulate (or not
regulate) their emotional response.
In order to further ensure that participants were engaging
in the relevant process (i.e., intra- or interpersonal regulation)
participants were told that during the first scan (intrapersonal
regulation) the other person would also be focusing on regu-
lating their own emotions. Participants were also told prior to
the intrapersonal scan that “During the experiment you will
see the face of an actual person in the bottom-right hand corner
of the screen. However, we would like the focus of your atten-
tion to be on the videos rather than on this person.” Before the
inter-personal videos, subjects were told “The second experiment
is almost identical to the first. However rather than trying to con-
trol your own emotions, we would like you to try to help the other
person watching the video to control their emotions. You have
already seen these videos and so have experienced how to control
your own emotions. We now want you to use this experience to
1During both scans the video-link of the other person watching the films was
pre-recorded, although participants were informed that it was a live video-
link.
2Although vocalization was only strictly necessary for the interpersonal task
(i.e., in order to meet the requirements of an interpersonal emotion regulation
task; see Zaki and Williams, 2013), participants were also instructed to vocal-
ize their chosen strategy for emotion regulation in the intrapersonal condition
in order to matchmotor movements related to speaking across the conditions.
tell the person in the corner of the screen how they should control
their emotions.”
For the next 5 s of the video, following the vocalization of
a strategy, participants were required to continue watching the
video and continue to regulate their emotions, or those of the
other person using their chosen regulation strategy. During this
period, on two-thirds of the trials the facial expression of the
other person began to slowly return to neutral. On the other one-
third of the trials, the facial expression of the other person did
not return to “neutral,” but stayed as the target emotion, suggest-
ing that the participant’s regulatory effort had been apparently
ineffective on that trial. This procedure was adopted to reflect
the fact that intra- and interpersonal regulation are not always
successful in everyday life3. As the participant spoke during the
first 5 s following onset of the video, it therefore appeared that the
participants’ utterance in the interpersonal condition influenced
the other person’s emotional response. In other words, the reg-
ulatory attempt and the other person’s emotional response were
temporally bound together in a manner that promoted a causal
interpretation. On some videos the other person would occasion-
ally make eye contact with the camera, and make small gestures
(e.g., head nodding, etc.) toward the camera in order to give
the sense that the interaction between the participant and them-
selves was dynamic. During production of the videos of the other
person they had been watching the actual videos on a monitor
and heard sample regulatory phrases spoken during the time-
frame in which the participants would subsequently be doing so.
Therefore, the reactions were matched to the content and time-
course of the videos. Following the video there was then another
3Analysis of the behavioral data revealed no differences between ‘successful’
and ‘unsuccessful’ regulation trials in the perceived affect of the other per-
son. This lack of difference, in addition to the relatively small number of
‘unsuccessful’ trials, meant that we did not model these events separately in
the analysis of the fMRI data.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 376 | 3
Hallam et al. Interpersonal emotion regulation
5-s period during which participants continued to implement
their emotion-regulation strategy and continued to see only the
other person watching the video with them in the corner of the
screen. During this time the facial expression of the other person
continued to return to neutral (or remained as the target emotion
in one-third of trials).
In order to measure the effects of implementing emotion regu-
lation strategies on emotional arousal and effort, during the final
20-s of each trial participants used a button box to rate, on a 7-
point Likert scale, the intensity of their own or the other person’s
emotional experience (“how disgusted / sad do you currently feel
/ how disgusted / sad does person outside the scanner feel?”), and
how difficult they found that trial (“how difficult did you find it
to follow the instructions?”; see Figure 1). These measures also
ensured that participants were adhering to the task and making
effortful attempts to follow the instructions on each trial.
Both the intra- and interpersonal scans consisted of 21 trials
that each involved watching a video, enacting emotion regulation
(or watch) strategy and answering self-report questions. Within
each scan three sadness-inducing and three disgust-inducing
video clips were viewed three times each, under instructions to
“watch,” “reappraise,” or “suppress.” Additionally, three “neutral”
videos were viewed under the condition of “watch” only. The
order of the videos was pseudo-randomized such that no reg-
ulation strategy (suppress, reappraise, watch) or type of video
(disgusting, sad, neutral) appeared more than three times in suc-
cession. Four different orders of the stimuli within each scan were
used in a between-participant counter-balanced design. At the
end of all the scanning sessions participants were debriefed.
In experiments investigating interpersonal interactions such
as interpersonal emotion regulation, it is important to establish
that the participants are meaningfully engaging with each other.
To this end, within this study, the person in the video had met
with the participant on the day prior to the scan and conducted
a practice session with them. This ensured that each of the par-
ticipants had the same level of interaction and familiarity with
the other person, and also increased the likelihood that partici-
pants would be motivated to regulate that person’s emotion. The
practice session also ensured that prior to the scanning sessions
participants were familiar with the tasks and nature of the videos
they would be seeing. In summary, and importantly for inter-
preting differences between the intra- and interpersonal tasks,
the design ensured that the two conditions were identical in all
respects and differed only in the perspective that the participant
in the scanner adopted; i.e., focusing either on regulating their
own or another person’s response to an emotionally arousing
video.
fMRI DATA ACQUISITION
During each functional run, 280 time points were obtained
at 3T (Achieva, Philips Medical Systems, Best, NL) compris-
ing 32× 4mm thick contiguous slices (in-plane resolution
1.797× 1.797mm) covering the entire cerebrum and cerebel-
lum. A single-shot, gradient-recalled echo planar imaging (EPI)
sequence was used: repetition time = 3 s; echo time = 35ms;
FOV= 240mm; in-plane matrix = 128× 128mm). A high
resolution, whole-brain, T1-weighted structural scan was also
collected from each participant (3D gradient echo, MP-RAGE,
TR = 10.5ms; TE = 4.8ms; spatial resolution= 0.8mm3).
During the scan participants wore MR-compatible head-
phones with microphone that was adjusted to fit over the mouth.
Participants were informed of the importance ofminimizing head
movement. Specifically, they were told that the microphone was
sensitive and they therefore did not need to speak too loudly while
providing the regulatory phrase. This helped ensure to that par-
ticipants’ head movements were kept to a minimum during the
scan.
fMRI DATA PREPROCESSING
Scan data were analyzed in SPM 8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/) implemented inMATLAB 7.1 (Math-works Inc., Sherborn,
MA). Images were motion-corrected, spatially normalized to each
individual’s high-resolution T1-weighted scan, and smoothed
with a Gaussian kernel (full-width half-maximum of 8mm).
Two out of the total 40 functional runs were discarded due to
excessive head motion during the scan (>2.5mm in any plane).
Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) response was modeled
to an event related wave-form, convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function and its temporal derivative.
Participants’ movement parameters were included as regressors
in the final contrast model in order to control for movement
artifacts.
Our contrast of interest focused on the 15-s period where
participants watched the video and performed emotion regula-
tion. At the first individual subject-level, epochs of “reappraisal”
and “suppression” were contrasted with emotional videos viewed
under the instruction to “watch.” These first level, fixed-effects
analyses were taken forward to a second, group-level, flexible
factorial design, that allowed examination of main-effects and
interactions, with factors of participant, scan (intrapersonal or
interpersonal) and regulation strategy (reappraise, watch, or sup-
press). Results are presented at p < 0.001 uncorrected. This sta-
tistical threshold was employed given the exploratory and novel
nature of these comparisons and is in line with recommendations
for such complex and subtle cognitive processes, as used in pre-
vious social and affective neuroscience studies (Lieberman and
Cunningham, 2009).
RESULTS
EFFECT OF INTRAPERSONAL AND INTERPERSONAL EMOTION
REGULATION ON SELF-REPORT BEHAVIORAL RATINGS
A 3-within scan (regulation strategy: suppression, reappraisal
or watch) by 2-between scan (regulation type: intrapersonal
or interpersonal) repeated measures ANOVA with emotional
experience as the dependent variable showed a main effect of reg-
ulation strategy [F(2, 38) = 8.04, p < 0.01, Figure 2] with emo-
tional experience being higher in the watch condition than in
the suppression (p < 0.05, p < 0.001 for intra- and interpersonal,
respectively) and reappraisal (p < 0.01, p < 0.001) conditions.
For the intrapersonal scans, ratings of emotional experience were
also significantly higher for suppression than for reappraisal tri-
als (p < 0.05), suggesting that suppression was a less effective
strategy for regulating own, but not others, emotions. There
was no main effect of regulation type (intra- vs. inter-personal)
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Mean ratings for how emotional the participants felt
(intrapersonal scan) or how emotional the participant judged the other
person to be (interpersonal scan). There was a main effect of regulation
strategy [F(2, 38) = 8.04, p < 0.01]. For intra- and interpersonal scans,
emotions were higher in the watch condition in comparison to both the
suppression (p < 0.05, p < 0.001 for intra- and interpersonal regulation,
respectively) and reappraisal (p < 0.01, p < 0.001) conditions. During
intrapersonal regulation, ratings were also significantly higher for
suppression in comparison to reappraisal trials (p < 0.05) but not for
interpersonal regulation. Ratings for the “intra” conditions refer to the
participant’s current affective state, whereas ratings for the “inter”
conditions refer to what the participant judged the other person’s
affective state to be. (B) There was no main effect of regulation type on
the difficulty of following instructions in the interpersonal regulation run
[F(2, 38) = 0.55, p = 0.58], indicating that participants adhered to
instructions and engaged in the relevant processes.
on the perceived effort expended [F(2, 38) = 0.55, p = 0.58,
Figure 2].
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF INTRAPERSONAL EMOTION
REGULATION
Intrapersonal regulation (reappraisal and suppression combined)
contrasted with watch trials was associated with activation of left
IFG (BA 45), pSMA (BA 6), right DLPFC (middle frontal gyrus;
BA 46), right VLPFC (BA 47), left superior frontal gyrus (BA
10), right supramarginal gyrus/TPJ, left posterior cingulate, left
TPJ (BA 39/40), right cuneus/posterior cingulate (BA 23/31), and
cerebellum (p < 0.001 uncorrected; Table 1, Figure 3).
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF INTERPERSONAL EMOTION
REGULATION
Interpersonal emotion regulation (reappraisal and suppression
combined) contrasted with “watch” trials was associated, in com-
mon with intrapersonal emotion regulation, with activation of
IFG (BA 45) and pSMA (BA 6); but additionally with activation
within bilateral inferior temporal gyrus (BA 20), rostral medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC; BA 10), mPFC (BA 8 and 9), left ACC
(BA 9/32), left TPJ (BA 39/40) and right temporal pole; (BA38)
(p < 0.001, Table 2, Figure 4).
COMMON ACTIVATIONS FOR INTRAPERSONAL AND INTERPERSONAL
EMOTION REGULATION
A conjunction analysis was performed to further investigate brain
areas involved in both the intrapersonal and interpersonal con-
ditions. This revealed areas involved in both conditions were
the pSMA (BA6), left IFG (BA45), and the left TPJ (BA39/40)
(Table 3, Figure 5).
COMPARISON OF THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL BASES OF
INTRAPERSONAL AND INTERPERSONAL EMOTION REGULATION
Brain areas more involved in intrapersonal than interpersonal
emotion regulation included bilateral posterior cingulate (BA 31),
right ACC (BA 32), right insula (BA 13), left DLPFC; BA 46),
left precentral gyrus/inferior frontal gyrus (BA 6/9), left mPFC
(BA 6), right cerebellum, left superior temporal gyrus (BA 22),
and left superior frontal gyrus (Table 4). Areas more involved
in interpersonal than intrapersonal emotion regulation included
the left temporal pole (superior temporal gyrus; BA 38), rostral
mPFC (BA 10), bilateral inferior temporal gyrus (BA 20), right
posterior insula (BA 13), right cingulate gyrus (BA 31), bilat-
eral caudate, and right cuneus/inferior parietal lobule (BA 7/40)
(Flexible factorial design, Table 5).
We also conducted an exploratory comparison of whether the
activations observed for interpersonal regulation differed accord-
ing to the instruction of reappraisal and suppression, though
no hypotheses had been made about this given that there have
been no previous investigations into the neural basis of differ-
ent interpersonal emotion regulation strategies, and there was no
self-reported difference between perceived effectiveness of each
strategy from the self-report data.
INTERPERSONAL REAPPRAISAL
The contrast of interpersonal reappraisal emotion regulation tri-
als contrasted with interpersonal watch trials revealed activation
within rostral prefrontal cortex (BA10), medial prefrontal cor-
tex (BA8), left temporal pole (BA38), and left insula (Table 5).
Expanding this contrast to directly compare interpersonal and
intrapersonal reappraisal revealed increased activation in left
inferior temporal gyrus (BA20), left temporal pole (BA38), left
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Table 1 | Areas activated in the contrast intrapersonal emotion
regulation (reappraisal and suppression combined) > watch.
Area Tal coordinates Voxels z value
X Y Z
Lt. Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) −42 12 16 681 5.75
−44 30 13 4.52
−42 6 3 3.76
Pre-supplementary motor area
(BA 6)
−2 13 56 824 5.13
22 11 58 4.83
14 15 58 4.57
Lt. Posterior cingulate gyrus −18 −38 24 61 4.53
Lt. Temporo-parietal junction −48 −44 21 386 4.40
−48 −53 19 4.35
−59 −52 −39 3.78
Lt. Cerebellum −6 −56 −39 138 4.36
/ Peri-acqueductal gray 6 −45 −36 4.18
2 −52 −39 3.89
Rt. Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 44 36 24 322 4.27
(BA 46) 38 40 18 3.80
36 41 9 3.61
Rt. Insula (BA 13) 42 10 0 128 4.24
Rt. Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
(BA 47)
32 19 −6 4.02
Rt. Temporo-parietal junction
/supramarginal gyrus
36 −49 32 109 4.23
Lt. Superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) −28 40 15 120 4.20
Bilateral cuneus /post. cingulate
(BA 23/31)
14 −61 18 610 4.14
−8 −68 33 4.03
8 −63 31 3.92
Data presented at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 30 voxels.
Co-ordinates are shown in standardized neuroanatomical space (Talairach and
Tournoux, 1988). BA, Brodmann’s area; Lt., left; Rt., right; post., posterior. Co-
ordinates without a corresponding extent threshold are shown in italics and refer
to sub-clusters of the preceding activation.
putamen, rostral medial prefrontal cortex (BA10), left cingulate
gyrus (BA23), and right inferior parietal lobule (Table 6).
INTERPERSONAL SUPPRESSION
The contrast of interpersonal suppression emotion regulation tri-
als contrasted with interpersonal watch trials revealed activation
within left inferior temporal gyrus/temporal pole, medial pre-
frontal cortex (BA8), left inferior frontal gyrus, right anterior
insula (BA13), superior frontal gyrus (BA6), left cingulate gyrus
(BA32), and left temporo-parietal junction (BA40). Expanding
this contrast to directly compare interpersonal and intraper-
sonal suppression revealed increased activation in the left anterior
temporal pole (BA38) and left caudate (Table 6).
POST SCANNING DEBRIEFING
To clarify the experiences of participants during the experiment
we debriefed participants following the scans. Participants
believed that the phrases they had uttered during the
interpersonal scan had been used by the conspecific to try
and control their emotional responses. No participants reported
any suspicion that the experimental set-up had not been live.
DISCUSSION
The present research directly compared the regulation of own
emotions (intrapersonal emotion regulation) with the regulation
of another person’s emotions (interpersonal emotion regulation).
Both types of regulation recruited areas previously implicated
in intrapersonal regulation, including inferior frontal gyrus and
pre-supplementary motor area. However interpersonal regula-
tion, which involves helping another person to reappraise or
suppress their emotions, additionally recruited areas that have
been previously implicated in mentalizing and other facets of
social cognition, including the left anterior temporal pole and
medial prefrontal cortex.
Both intrapersonal and interpersonal emotion regulation were
associated with a largely overlapping network of brain areas,
incorporating the bilateral lateral frontal cortices, the pSMA, and
left TPJ. Frontal activation is consistent with the findings of pre-
vious studies on the cognitive control of one’s own emotion
(Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Banks et al., 2007; Wager et al., 2008;
Kalisch, 2009) and suggests that both tasks involved a degree of
control over one’s own emotional experience. This was in line
with our hypotheses for the intrapersonal task. However find-
ing similar areas of activation for the interpersonal condition
supports the notion that successfully regulating another person’s
emotion involves “simulation” of the intrapersonal process. This
simulation may, in part, explain why interpersonal emotion regu-
lation has been considered an “effortful” process that affects social
and personal well-being (Niven et al., 2012).
It is noteworthy that we found activation within the pSMA for
both conditions (as confirmed by conjunction analysis). A meta-
analysis by Kalisch (2009) of the regulation of negative emotion by
reappraisal reported that activation within pSMA is a consistent
finding across studies. One possible explanation is that activa-
tion within pSMA reflects the requirement for response inhibition
(Hampshire et al., 2010); something that is an inherent compo-
nent of emotion regulation. It is also possible that, given this
area’s involvement in occulomotor control (Grosbras et al., 2005),
activation within pSMA may reflect the redeployment of atten-
tional resources to non-emotional components of a stimulus (van
Reekum et al., 2007). Further studies could attempt to clarify the
precise role of the pSMA in emotion regulation. Such an inves-
tigation would be highly informative given the consistency with
which this region has been activated, not only within studies of
emotion regulation but also within neuroimaging studies more
generally (Behrens et al., 2013).
Although the involvement of TPJ in the interpersonal con-
dition was hypothesized (given its previously identified role in
mentalizing, (e.g., Gallagher et al., 2000), TPJ has not been con-
sistently associated with paradigms involving the control of one’s
own emotional experience. One speculative explanation for the
role of TPJ in intrapersonal emotion regulation is that our study
conceptualized intrapersonal emotion regulation in a more social
context. That is, the task involved the control of emotion in the
presence of another person, albeit a person that the participant
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FIGURE 3 | Intrapersonal emotion regulation (reappraisal & suppression vs. watch), p < 0.001, extent threshold = 10 voxels.
Table 2 | Areas activated in the contrast interpersonal emotion
regulation (reappraisal and suppression combined) > watch.
Area Tal coordinates Voxels z value
X Y Z
Lt. Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) −38 16 14 109 5.32
Pre-supplementary motor area
(BA 6)
−4 11 57 163 4.98
Rt. Inferior temporal gyrus (BA 20) 50 −7 −28 58 4.91
48 −2 −34 3.55
Rostral medial prefrontal cortex
(BA 10)
4 59 12 155 4.40
Rt. Superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) 16 59 17 120 3.96
24 57 14 3.61
Rt. Medial prefrontal cortex (BA 9) 14 44 18 85 4.36
16 43 5 4.17
Lt. Anterior cingulate (BA 9/32) −10 38 17 63 4.26
Lt. Inferior temporal gyrus (BA 20) −44 −13 −21 34 4.13
−44 −18 −16 3.39
Medial frontal gyrus (BA 8) 2 31 39 73 4.08
4 23 38 3.39
Pulvinar −4 25 14 76 4.03
Lt. Temporo-parietal junction −61 −48 12 156 3.92
−53 −44 13 3.78
−58 −45 26 3.72
Rt. Temporal pole (BA 38) 48 15 16 3.82
51 17 −8 3.69
57 18 1 3.30
Data presented at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 30 voxels.
Co-ordinates are shown in standardized neuroanatomical space (Talairach and
Tournoux, 1988). BA, Brodmann’s area; Lt., left; Rt., right; post., posterior. Co-
ordinates without a corresponding extent threshold are shown in italics and refer
to sub-clusters of the preceding activation.
was instructed to ignore. It is possible, that participants had the
sense that their emotion regulation was in part motivated (and
perhaps being monitored) by the other person, and so processes
akin tomentalizing were evoked (i.e., “what does the other person
think of my regulation attempts?”). This explanation is consistent
with the traditional view that the TPJ underpins such mentalizing
FIGURE 4 | Conjunction analysis showing common activations of
intrapersonal and interpersonal emotion regulation, p < 0.001, extent
threshold 30 voxels.
Table 3 | Conjunction analysis showing areas involved in both
intrapersonal and interpersonal conditions.
Area Tal coordinates Voxels z value
X Y Z
Lt. Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) −38 18 14 91 5.14
Pre-supplementary motor area
(BA 6)
−4 11 57 128 4.89
Lt. Temporo-parietal junction −59 −50 14 56 3.67
Data presented at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 30 voxels.
Co-ordinates are shown in standardized neuroanatomical space (Talairach and
Tournoux, 1988). BA, Brodmann’s area; Lt., left; Rt., right; post., posterior.
processes (Gallagher and Frith, 2003), and is consistent with a
recent study that found TPJ involvement in the reappraisal of
another person’s intentions (Grecucci et al., 2013).
The left DLPFC and ACC were significantly activated in the
intrapersonal regulation task when compared directly with the
interpersonal condition. Activation within the frontal cortex,
particularly DLPFC, is consistent with the existing literature
on the cognitive control of emotion (Beauregard et al., 2001;
Ochsner et al., 2002; Phan et al., 2005; Eippert et al., 2007;
Goldin et al., 2008). Activation in the cuneus/posterior cingu-
late was not hypothesized during intrapersonal regulation; how-
ever, one plausible interpretation would be that this region is
involved in self-reflective processing (Lou et al., 2004) and the
instructions for intrapersonal regulation required participants
to focus on their own rather than the other person’s emotions.
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FIGURE 5 | Interpersonal emotion regulation (interpersonal reappraisal
& suppression vs. watch), p < 0.001 uncorrected, extent threshold =
10 voxels.
Table 4 | Areas activated by the main effect of intrapersonal emotion
regulation (intrapersonal emotion regulation - watch > interpersonal
emotion regulation > watch).
Area Tal coordinates Voxels z value
X Y Z
Rt. Posterior cingulate gyrus 28 −51 19 193 4.17
(BA 31) 26 −53 36 3.05
20 −56 16 2.63
Lt. Posterior Cingulate gyrus −18 −38 24 35 3.63
Peri-acqueductal gray 4 −46 −33 75 3.45
−2 −56 −39 3.29
6 −54 −33 2.79
Rt. Anterior Cingulate (BA 32) 22 30 19 50 3.43
Rt. Insula (BA 13) 44 10 0 33 3.40
36 8 −4 2.94
Lt. Dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (BA 46)
−42 30 11 36 3.40
Lt. Precentral gyrus (BA 6/9) −48 −7 24 32 3.31
Lt. Medial frontal gyrus (BA 6) −8 −26 53 32 3.22
−18 11 58 37 3.19
Rt. Cerebellum 30 −42 −28 79 3.18
36 −42 −21 2.82
Lt. Superior temporal gyrus
(BA 22)
−55 −10 4 50 3.16
−55 −7 11 3.11
Lt. Superior frontal gyrus −28 40 15 36 3.06
Data presented at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 10 voxels.
Co-ordinates are shown in standardized neuroanatomical space (Talairach and
Tournoux, 1988). BA, Brodmann’s area; Lt., left; Rt., right; post., posterior. Co-
ordinates without a corresponding extent threshold are shown in italics and refer
to sub-clusters of the preceding activation.
Activation within the posterior cingulate may therefore reflect
the increased requirement for self-monitoring during the intrap-
ersonal task, whereas in the interpersonal condition there was
no requirement to self-monitor. Participants also knew that they
would be asked to reflect upon their own emotional state dur-
ing the questions that followed each trial during the intrapersonal
run.
Table 5 | Areas activated by the main effect of interpersonal emotion
regulation (interpersonal emotion regulation - watch > intrapersonal
emotion regulation > watch).
Area Tal coordinates Voxels z value
X Y Z
Lt. Temporal pole (BA 38) −34 14 −28 34 4.30
Lt. Pons −16 −21 −28 77 3.80
Rostral medial PFC(BA 10) 2 59 15 18 3.48
Lt. Inferior temporal gyrus (BA 20) −44 −13 −21 11 3.44
Rt. Posterior Insula (BA 13) 28 −24 21 10 3.20
Lt. Caudate −10 1 15 27 3.11
Rt. Inferior temporal gyrus (BA 20) 51 −7 −27 12 3.09
Pons −2 −32 −19 20 3.07
Rt. Cuneus/Inferior parietal lobule
(BA 7/40)
26 −44 48 17 2.91
Data presented at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 10 voxels.
Co-ordinates are shown in standardized neuroanatomical space (Talairach and
Tournoux, 1988). BA, Brodmann’s area; Lt., left; Rt., right; post., posterior.
THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL EMOTION REGULATION
Brain areas uniquely involved in interpersonal regulation
included the left temporal pole, rostral medial prefrontal cor-
tex, bilateral inferior temporal gyrus, right posterior insula, right
cingulate gyrus, bilateral caudate, and right cuneus/inferior pari-
etal lobule. When this activation was decomposed into the neural
regions associated with reappraisal or suppression there were acti-
vations common to both strategies and also some differences.
Both strategies showed increased activation within left anterior
temporal pole and inferior temporal gyrus. However, interper-
sonal reappraisal was also associated with additional activation of
rostral prefrontal cortex and areas of cingulate gyrus. One expla-
nation for this additional activation might be that reappraisal
requires a clearer distinction to be made between the self and
another person than does suppression. Such an explanation is
supported by the posited role of rostral prefrontal cortex and
areas of cingulate gyrus in supporting distinctions between the
self and others (Burgess et al., 2007; Raposo et al., 2011), although
the medial prefrontal cortex has also been shown to be involved
in representation of the self (Qin and Northoff, 2011; Denny
et al., 2012). Activation within rostral PFC has also been reported
as reflecting the emotional synchrony between two individuals
(Kühn et al., 2011); something that participants were likely to
be more engaged in during interpersonal regulation than during
intrapersonal regulation. The increased activation within rostral
PFC during interpersonal emotion regulation using reappraisal
suggests that this emotional synchrony may have been more pro-
nounced for reappraisal than for suppression, because of the
more cognitive nature of reappraisal in comparison to the more
behavioral instruction of suppression.
We also found involvement of the caudate during interper-
sonal reappraisal. Although this had not been hypothesized, case
studies have suggested that damage to the caudate impairs the
affective components of theory of mind and recognition of other
people’s negative emotional states (Kemp et al., 2013), both of
which are likely to be involved in helping another person to
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Table 6 | Areas activated by interpersonal emotion regulation.
Area Tal coordinates Voxels z value
X Y Z
INTERPERSONAL REAPPRAISAL > WATCH
Rt. Superior frontal gyrus (BA8) 14 33 46 13 4.07
Medial prefrontal cortex (BA10) 4 59 10 77 3.98
8 51 7 3.63
8 49 14 3.26
Rt. Caudate 14 −24 18 16 3.79
Lt. Putamen −22 −4 7 25 3.58
Lt. Temporal Pole (BA38) −55 14 3 14 3.50
Lt. Cuneus (BA7) −14 −58 53 15 3.45
Thalamus 4 −21 3 18 3.45
Peri-acqueductal gray 2 −35 −3 21 3.38
INTERPERSONAL SUPPRESSION > WATCH
Lt. Inferior temporal gyrus (BA20) −50 −7 −28 31 4.77
−46 −9 −18 3.31
Medial prefrontal cortex (BA8) 2 31 39 57 4.62
Lt. Inferior frontal gyrus (BA45) −40 20 14 70 4.34
Rt. Superior frontal gyrus (BA6) 18 16 53 29 4.29
Rt. Anterior insula (BA13) 36 16 0 35 4.15
Lt. Cingulate gyrus (BA32) −10 21 32 25 4.11
Lt. TPJ (BA40) −57 −47 24 35 3.93
Rt. Middle frontal gyrus (BA9) 34 27 37 41 3.81
Medial prefrontal cortex (BA10) 16 43 5 21 3.55
INTERPERSONAL REAPPRAISAL > INTRAPERSONAL REAPPRAISAL
Lt. Inferior temporal gyrus (BA20) −38 −17 −21 26 4.27
Lt. Pons −8 −17 −23 21 3.90
Lt. Putamen −24 −11 13 31 3.88
Lt. Temporal Pole (BA38) −36 10 −27 28 3.85
Rt. Caudate 26 −22 23 20 3.84
Medial prefrontal cortex (BA10) 8 51 7 32 3.81
Lt. Cingulate gyrus (BA23) −10 −14 28 23 3.74
Lt. Superior frontal gyrus (BA9) −6 50 23 16 3.63
Rt. Inferior parietal lobule (BA7) 30 −46 47 25 3.56
INTERPERSONAL SUPPRESSION > INTRAPERSONAL SUPPRESSION
Lt. Anterior temporal pole (BA38) −34 16 −26 14 4.08
Lt. Inferior temporal gyrus (BA20) −50 −7 −28 6* 3.94
Rt. Lingual gyrus 20 −84 −8 8* 3.50
Lt. Caudate −8 1 17 13 3.43
Data presented at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) with an extent threshold of 10 voxels
(* indicates clusters with an extent threshold of 5 voxels).
Co-ordinates are shown in standardized neuroanatomical space (Talairach and
Tournoux, 1988). BA, Brodmann’s area; Lt., left; Rt., right; post., posterior. Co-
ordinates without a corresponding extent threshold are shown in italics and refer
to sub-clusters of the precedingactivation.
reappraise their emotions. Furthermore given that the caudate
has also been shown to be activated when a reward is expected
(Haruno et al., 2004; Benningfield et al., 2014) it is also possible
that the activation of the caudate may reflect a sense of reward felt
by participants at helping the other person control their emotion,
given that interpersonal emotion regulation is known to have
effects not only on the target of the regulation but also on the per-
son doing the regulation (Niven et al., 2012). Such an explanation
might be consistent with studies that have suggested that cau-
date is particularly involved in processing reward that arises as
a direct result of the participant’s actions (Tricomi et al., 2004; see
Grahn et al., 2008 for a review of the role of the caudate in cogni-
tion). Interpersonal suppression, when compared to watch, also
revealed activation in the right anterior insula. This is noteworthy
given the insula’s involvement in the representation of emotional
experience (Zaki et al., 2012) and in affective decision making
(Singer et al., 2009), and could further support the notion that
participants simulated the other person’s affective state during
interpersonal emotion regulation.
Activation within the anterior temporal pole during interper-
sonal emotion regulation is consistent with studies that demon-
strate the involvement of these areas in cognitive empathy such as
“mentalizing” (Gallagher and Frith, 2003) and the interpretation
of another person’s mental state (Jimura et al., 2010). These find-
ings support the idea that interpersonal emotion regulation is also
underpinned by similar processes to mentalizing, which is consis-
tent with the need to take the perspective of the other person in
order to successfully regulate their emotion.
Activation within the bilateral inferior temporal gyri has also
been reported in previous research into the neural basis of empa-
thy (Farrow et al., 2001), although this activation has been less
consistently observed than has activation in areas such as the
medial prefrontal cortex. Activation within the bilateral inferior
temporal gyri within the current study supports this region’s
contribution to empathy. However, given that we had made no
specific hypothesis concerning this region, this finding must be
treated with caution. Activation within areas of anterior temporal
pole for both conditions (interpersonal reappraisal and suppres-
sion), taken in conjunction with activation of inferior frontal
gyrus associated with the regulation of a person’s own emotional
state, may also lend support to the affective simulation account
of empathy (Decety and Lamm, 2007). Activation in the inferior
frontal gyrus suggests that regulating another person’s emotion
may involve “reliving” the emotional response and modeling the
regulation process in order to help the other person to control
their emotional state.
LIMITATIONS
One limitation of the current study is that, although provid-
ing advice on how to regulate emotions to another person and
monitoring the effects of the advice does constitute one form
of interpersonal emotion regulation, there are nevertheless many
other forms of interpersonal emotion regulation that differ in
their manner of implementation and intended effects (for a
review, see Niven et al., 2009). One dimension on which types
of interpersonal emotion regulation may differ concerns an indi-
vidual’s reasons for performing interpersonal emotion regulation,
which may vary from the entirely selfish to the wholly altruistic.
For example, an individual in a relationship may selfishly wish
to quickly regulate their partner’s negative emotion in order to
allow them to watch their favorite TV program. It seems likely that
more selfish reasons for performing emotion regulation may not
necessarily invoke the mechanisms of empathy to the same extent
as seen in this study. Further studies could investigate this issue
by, for example, investigating regulating the emotions of someone
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better known to the participant (e.g., a close friend) would result
in a different pattern of activation to regulating the emotions of a
less well-known person, as in the present research. Further studies
may also wish to further explore the differences between success-
ful and unsuccessful interpersonal regulation attempts in more
detail.
Another limitation of the current study was that the intraper-
sonal scan always preceded the interpersonal scan, leaving open
the possibility that activations, particularly within the interper-
sonal scan, may be influenced to some extent by habituation
to the stimuli or repetition of the general regulatory processes.
Debriefing of participants during piloting of the paradigm prior
to scanning revealed that it was not possible to counterbalance the
order of runs in such a manner that participants were able to fully
engage in interpersonal regulation without first having engaged
in intrapersonal regulation. Future research could, however, focus
exclusively on a more in-depth exploration of interpersonal reg-
ulation. Alternatively, studies might consider using a different set
of emotion-eliciting stimuli in an intrapersonal task, as compared
to an interpersonal task. We felt that repetition of the stimuli was
necessary in the present research, given the nuanced nature of
our paradigm and the need to keep as much as possible equiva-
lent between intrapersonal and interpersonal emotion regulation.
Specifically, we wanted to use the same videos in the interpersonal
run as in the intrapersonal run to focus participants’ attention
on the interpersonal regulation aspect; essentially, the participant
was using their experiences from the intrapersonal scan in order
to help the other person in the interpersonal scan.
Finally, the presence of the other person in the corner of
the screen in the intrapersonal task may have interfered with
the self-regulation process because participants may have been
monitoring the other person in addition to attempting to regu-
late their own emotional response. This is reflected in the data
to the extent that regions associated with social cognition, such
as TPJ, were activated during intrapersonal emotion regulation.
However, the fact that (i) we found activation within regions
previously demonstrated to be involved in intrapersonal regula-
tion (pSMA, DLPFC) and (ii) the behavioral data indicated that
intrapersonal emotion regulation occurred on the relevant trials
confirms that the present paradigm provided a valid intrapersonal
emotion regulation task. The necessity of setting up the paradigm
in this manner was driven by the aim of directly comparing
intra- and interpersonal scans. Although not having the conspe-
cific present in the corner of the screen during the intrapersonal
scan would undoubtedly been more consistent with previous
paradigms investigating intrapersonal ER, this would have pre-
vented any direct comparison with the interpersonal run (e.g.,
any differences found could simply have been a function of the
inclusion of another person on the screen). Future studies could
further investigate potential differences by using paradigms that
manipulate whether participants’ attempts to regulate their own
emotion occur in the presence of other individuals or not. This is
particularly interesting question given that the majority of “real
world” emotion regulation is performed in front of an actual or
imagined audience (Erber et al., 1996).
We also acknowledge that due to the exploratory nature
of this study, we have made use of “reverse inference” in the
interpretation of some of our findings. Such inferences have been
said to be limited when the selectivity of the regions discussed
cannot be established (Poldrack, 2006). However recent work sug-
gests that emotion processing recruits a range of mental processes
that are also used for other purposes, such as empathy and men-
talizing (e.g., Lindquist et al., 2012). Within such a framework it
is the combination of these processes that differentiates the differ-
ent types of emotion regulation and distinguishes it from other
processes. Future studies into interpersonal emotion regulation
that systematically manipulates the proposed component factors
could help provide a more in-depth exploration.
IMPLICATIONS
The results of the present study may help to understand condi-
tions in which both intra- and interpersonal emotion regulatory
processes are dysfunctional, such as schizophrenia. Our findings
suggest that interpersonal emotion regulation shares overlap-
ping neural substrates with intrapersonal emotion regulation, but
also involves activation of areas previously implicated in affective
and cognitive components of empathy. This may help to explain
why deficits in these processes, such as those that have previ-
ously been observed in disorders such as schizophrenia (e.g., Lee
et al., 2004, 2006), may partially manifest as a reduced capacity
for interpersonal emotion regulation and hence problems with
social interaction. Such an interpretation fits with the idea that
schizophrenia can be characterized as a dysfunction of inter-
personal functioning (Frith, 1992). Further studies using similar
paradigms with clinical groups would help to understand how
specific deficits in interpersonal emotion regulation relate tomore
general deficits in interpersonal interactions.
CONCLUSION
The present research finds an overlapping pattern of activation
with an interpersonal emotion regulation task and an equivalent
intrapersonal emotion regulation task, incorporating a fronto-
parietal network. However, as well as the similarities involved in
both processes, there were additional activations associated with
interpersonal emotion regulation in brain areas that have previ-
ously been shown to be involved in the affective and cognitive
components of empathy. This was particularly the case when the
strategy used to influence the emotional state of the other person
was cognitive reappraisal rather than expressive suppression.
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